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WHOSE OX IS BEING GORED? WHEN
ATTITUDINALISM MEETS FEDERALISM
MICHAEL C. DORF*
ABSTRACT
Empirical research indicates that factors such as an individual
Justice's general political ideology play a substantial role in the
decision of Supreme Court cases. Although this pattern holds in
federalism cases, views about the proper allocation of authority
between the state and federal governments-independent of
whether the particular outcome in any given case is "liberal" or
"conservative"- can sometimes be decisive, as demonstrated by
the 2005 decision in Gonzales v. Raich, in which "conservative"
Justices voted to invalidate a strict federal drug provision in light
of California's legalization of medical marijuana and "liberal"
Justices voted to uphold the federal law. Proponents of a strongly
legal realist view of the Court might argue that views about
federalism are themselves ideological, or that Justices who
commit themselves to defending or opposing states' rights do so
because of a calculation about the likely long-term consequences of
such a position. But they do so only by draining the realist
enterprise of its descriptive and normative power, because, as this
Essay argues, genuine principles about federalism are distinctly
legal, even if formed on the basis of long-term calculations about
the likely effects of various views about federalism. Taking
federalism as a point of departure, this Essay describes and
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justifies a method by which Justices choose the legal principles
that bind them.
INTRODUCTION
Political scientists who study the Supreme Court do not take
legal doctrine very seriously. According to the leading view of the
political scientists-the "attitudinal model"-the attitudes of
individual Justices are a better predictor of how the Court will
resolve contested cases than is the sort of reasoning one finds in
briefs and opinions.1 By correlating each Justice's votes with a
variety of characteristics of the cases decided, the political
scientists can infer the truly decisive factors in Supreme Court
cases. Working within the tradition of legal realism, the
attitudinalists thus "find the key to judicial behavior in what the
justices do, [rather than] what they say."2
Even conventional legal scholars such as myself must
acknowledge that there is considerable truth to the political
scientists' claims. For example, we know that, should a case
come before the Court posing the question whether a state may
prohibit same-sex couples from adopting children, Justice Scalia
will be much less likely to find the prohibition unconstitutional
than Justice Kennedy would be. Why? Because we can
extrapolate from their respective votes on gay rights issues in
prior cases. 3 The political scientist does the same thing, only
more systematically. Because her computer model uses an
1 For an excellent summary of the political science literature, see Theodore W. Ruger
et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project:: Legal and Political Science Approaches to
Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1155-60 & nn.20-
36 (2004).
2 Harold J. Spaeth, Jurimetrics and Professor Mendelson: A Troubled Relationship, 27
J. POL. 875, 879 (1965).
3 Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-79 (2003) (Kennedy, J. writing for
the majority) (invalidating state criminal prohibition against same-sex sodomy as
violative of Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 623-36 (1996) (Kennedy, J., writing for the majority) (invalidating as violative of
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause state constitutional provision
prohibiting anti-discrimination measures based on "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships"), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("Texas's prohibition of sodomy neither infringes a 'fundamental right'...,
nor is unsupported by a rational relation to what the Constitution considers a legitimate
state interest, nor denies the equal protection of the laws."), and Romer, 517 U.S. at 636
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ('This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the
resolution.., pronouncing that animosity toward homosexuality is evil." (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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algorithm based on many more prior case outcomes than the
conventional legal scholar can hold in his head at any one time,
the political scientist is able to do for most cases what the
conventional legal scholar can only even begin to do in his areas
of expertise and perhaps in those areas in which the Justices'
views are well known among those generally knowledgeable
about the law.
To be sure, the conventional legal scholar adds what he
regards as an important qualifier: The reason Justices Scalia and
Kennedy will likely disagree about the constitutionality of my
hypothetical prohibition on adoption by same-sex couples is that
they disagree about the law. Justice Scalia takes a narrow view
of unenumerated rights and equal protection outside the context
of race discrimination and its very closest analogues, while
Justice Kennedy takes a broader view of both doctrines. 4 Of
course, the conventional legal scholar concedes, this
disagreement about the law is related in some way to the
respective values, ideology and preferences-all right, to the
attitudes-of the Justices, but, he insists, the legal disagreement
is not simply reducible to attitudes. Law plays a distinct
mediating role.
By contrast, the political scientist employs Occam's razor to
dispense with the metaphysical nonsense of law as a category
independent of values, ideology and preferences, at least in the
sorts of hard cases that reach the Supreme Court. Most
spectacularly, she can point to the results of a recent
experiment-the "Supreme Court Forecasting Project"5-in
which a cousin of the attitudinal model was matched against a
battery of legal experts, each of whom was asked to predict the
outcomes of then-pending cases in their respective fields of
4 Justice Scalia has stated that he believes the only unenumerated "fundamental
rights" protected by the Constitution's Due Process Clauses are those "interest[s]
traditionally protected by our society," Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989)
(plurality opinion), defined by reference "to the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified." Id. at
127 n.6. By contrast, Justice Kennedy would consider "asserted rights at levels of
generality that might not be 'the most specific level' available," and that "would not
foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis."
Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring in part). With respect to equal
protection, for example, Romer, discussed supra note 3.
5 For a website maintained by The Supreme Court Forecasting Project, see The
Washington University Supreme Court Forecasting Project, http://wusct.wustl.edu (last
visited Mar. 15, 2006).
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expertise: The statistical model correctly predicted the outcome
in seventy-five percent of the cases, while the human team was
right in only fifty-nine percent.6 Thus, armed with her statistics
and regression analyses, the political scientist can dismiss most
talk of "law" as worse than useless.
The kind of analysis performed by the political scientists
makes a very valuable contribution to our understanding of how
the Supreme Court actually functions, and accordingly, I agree
with those conventional legal scholars who argue that we ought
to pay more (which is to say, at least, some) attention to their
work than we currently do.7 But it would be a profound error to
conclude, on the basis of the attitudinalists' data, that law is
bunk (and the researchers who designed and conducted the
contest, to their credit, do not make any such sweeping
jurisprudential claims based on its results). 8 As I argue in this
Essay, the treatment of issues of federalism-in the political
branches as well as in the Court-shows why.
I. THE SUPREME COURT FORECASTING PROJECT
Before coming to questions of federalism, however, I want to
say a few more words in general about the Supreme Court
Forecasting Project. The first thing I want to say is that the
contest was, in a certain sense, rigged.
We legal experts were not asked, after all, what was the legally
correct outcome in the cases before the Court. We were asked to
predict how the individual Justices of the Rehnquist Court would
vote.9 It is not really surprising that a computer program
designed to predict the voting pattern of those nine people would
do a better job at that task than would scholars whose particular
6 See Ruger et al., supra note 1, at 1171 tbl.1. I take some small pride in the fact that
I personally did slightly better than the statistical model in predicting the results of the
cases about which I was asked.
7 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 258-
59 (2005) (observing that focus outside of legal academy "is not so much on how judges
should behave, as on how they do and why;" arguing that "normative constitutional
theory about judicial review will remain impoverished until it fully embraces [this]
positive project"); Ruger et al, supra note 1.
8 See Ruger et al., supra note 1. at 1190 ("[Alnything our study has to say about the
,nature of law itself is highly indirect.").
9 Ruger et al., supra note 1, at 1161 (conceding that legal experts' method of
prediction was not pure "legalism" because "the individual legal experts considered both
legal and nonlegal factors in reaching their predictions").
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expertise lies in the field of evaluating legal arguments rather
than in guessing how other people will evaluate legal arguments.
Moreover, from a certain perspective, the very design of the
contest between statisticians and legal scholars assumed the
correctness of the legal realist claims that one might think it was
designed to test. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously wrote that
the law is nothing more than "prophecies of what the courts will
do in fact .... "10 Some legal realists practically made this
aphorism their credo.'1 Of course, if you think that the law really
consists of nothing but predictions of how courts will behave,
then it is perfectly reasonable to design a contest that aims to
discern the most accurate mode of prediction.
But what if you think that there are better and worse answers
that can be given to any legal question, and that what makes one
answer better than another is something internal to legal
analysis?12 Perhaps the question is one of constitutional
interpretation and you are an originalist. Then you will be much
more interested in the original understanding than in what the
Supreme Court is going to say-even if the Supreme Court
employs an originalist approach to the particular issue in
question. Or perhaps you follow Ronald Dworkin in thinking
that the best answer to any legal question is the one that best fits
with and justifies the prior law, i.e., the answer that puts the law
as a whole in its best light.13 Then you will sometimes be critical
of the actual decisions of the Court, precisely because they depart
from what you would have predicted the Justices would decide
were they to apply your coherentist methodology correctly.
Unless the Court's opinion leads you to change your mind, the
10 OLIVER W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897),
reprinted in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1920).
11 See K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY
12-14 (3d ed. 1960); Joseph W. Bingham, What Is the Law?, 11 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1912);
Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part Two: As Through a Class Darkly, 80 U. PA. L.
REV. 233, 236 (1931).
12 H.L.A. Hart set out the most trenchant critique of the prediction approach. He
argued that it is at best a means of understanding the law from the outside, providing
little to no help to those who must make sense of the law from within. See H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 88-91 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed. 1994)
(distinguishing between external and internal aspects of rules); see also id. at 141-47
(addressing directly and rejecting realists' claims because even "open texture[d]" laws
have "core of settled meaning" from which judges are not free to depart, enabling critics to
state that judges' "rulings are, though final, not infallible").
13 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE vii (1986) ("[O]ur law consists in the best
justification of our legal practices as a whole").
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fact that you had incorrectly predicted what the Supreme Court
would do simply points out a failing of the Supreme Court. It
means that the Justices applied the wrong methodology, or
applied the right methodology incorrectly. In either event, the
failing is theirs, not yours. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
Forecasting Project could not possibly have proved that law is
bunk in any deep sense.
Moreover, the results of the Forecasting Project pose some
puzzles of their own. The legal experts actually did a better job
of predicting the votes of the more clearly "ideological" Justices of
the right and left, while the computer did a much better job of
predicting the "swing" votes of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.14
Why? A determined attitudinalist might say that the attitudes of
the Justices on the Court's extremes are so widely known that
the computer lost its competitive advantage as to them. In a
particularly nuanced case, a legal scholar could take account of
the ideologically liberal views of Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
as well as their jurisprudential preference for purposivism over
formalism. But, according to the attitudinalist, the attitudes of
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are subtler, and thus more
readily discoverable by the data mining and curve fitting of the
computer than by the legal scholar's analysis.
Yet we can easily place the opposite spin on the performance
differences with respect to the polar Justices and the swing
Justices. Who is to say that the difference between the Court's
conservatives and liberals is not itself a difference over law? On
this account, the reason Justice O'Connor and, to a lesser extent,
Justice Kennedy, were so hard for the legal scholars to predict
was that, as the swing votes, they controlled not only the
outcome but also the agenda of the late Rehnquist Court. Cases
came to the Supreme Court precisely when the outcome turned
on the choice between methodologies-such as originalism versus
purposivism5--or substantive issues-such as the permissibility
14 See Ruger et al., supra note 1, at 1172-75 & tbl.2 & fig.2.
15 Compare, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23-24 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J. concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (eschewing "historical argument[s]" about Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on disproportionate sentences; holding that "stare decisis
counsels our adherence to the narrow proportionality principle that has existed in our
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for 80 years")), with id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citing Harmelin, 501 at 967-85 (1991) (Scalia, J., writing for the majority) (employing
[Vol. 21:2
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of race-based affirmative action in higher education16-as to
which the views of the extremes were clear but those of the
centrists were more muddled. Viewed in this light, the computer
model won only where one would expect it to win: in those cases
and for those Justices for whom the law was, ex ante, unclear,
and thus as to whom, extra-legal factors would play the leading
role. Knowing this, however, does not tell us very much about
the relative roles played by law and attitudes in general.
Even with these large caveats, though, the results of the
contest are arresting. The computer model did, after all, get the
bottom line right more consistently than the humans did. Most
interestingly, it did so despite the fact that the model coded only
for six factors: "(1) circuit of origin; (2) issue area of the case; (3)
type of petitioner (e.g., the United Sates, an employer, etc.); (4)
type of respondent; (5) ideological direction (liberal or
conservative) of the lower court ruling; and (6) whether the
petitioner argued that a law or practice is unconstitutional."17
Yet by attending to this very small number of criteria, the
computer outperformed the experts.
That aspect of the Project's findings should not be especially
surprising to anyone familiar with empirical evaluations of
expertise in other fields. A formula that accounts only for
strikeouts, walks, and home runs better predicts a pitcher's
subsequent performance than do the much more multi-faceted
evaluations of professional baseball scouts;' 8 and doctors can do
better at diagnosing a heart attack by focusing on just four
factors-electrocardiograph, unstable angina, fluid in the lungs,
and systolic blood pressure-than by also considering other risk
factors.19 Perhaps really terrific experts could do better still by
adding in more factors-such as average fastball speed or patient
age, respectively-but for most experts, to the extent that such
factors make a difference, it appears that the limited-factor
models account for all the difference they make. Any
independent consideration of these factors is essentially noise.
original-intent analysis to reject notion that Eighth Amendment prohibits
disproportionate sentences in noncapital cases)).
16 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003).
17 Ruger et al., supra note 1, at 1163.
18 See MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL 236-40 (2004).
19 See MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 133-38 (2005).
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The results of the Supreme Court Forecasting Project likewise
suggest that nearly all of the considerations that we think should
play a decisive role in adjudication are, from a causal perspective,
also just noise. For example, in the recent Senate Judiciary
Committee confirmation hearings for Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito, the Senators repeatedly asked the nominees for
their views about precedent, and this was one of the few
questions about which the nominees gave straightforward and
detailed answers. 20 Was this a sensible focus for Senators
concerned about how the new Justices would vote on specific
issues the former deemed important? Apparently not. The
computer model in the Supreme Court Forecasting Project did
not code for the question of whether a party was asking the Court
to overrule a prior precedent, whereas legal scholars could and
did take this factor into account. 21 But the computer won
anyway. At least in the cases they actually decide, the Justices'
professed views about precedent seem to be mere noise.
II. ARE VIEWS ABOUT FEDERALISM VIEWS ABOUT THE LAw?
Indeed, looking at the six factors for which the Forecasting
Project did code, it is hard to see how any of the issues that
constitutional lawyers argue about figured into the analysis in
any detail. Suppose one were trying to predict, in early 1999,
whether or not the Court would say that Congress, when acting
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, 22 had the power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity in private suits for money damages in
state court. Less than three years earlier, in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida,23 the Court had ruled that under such
circumstances Congress could not abrogate state sovereign
immunity in suits in federal court, and much of the argument
and the ultimate opinion in the later case, Alden v. Maine,24
20 See Adam Liptak, Roberts Drops Hints in 'Precedent' Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 2005, § 1, at 30; Richard W. Stevenson & Neil A. Lewis, Alito, at Hearing, Pledges an
Open Mind on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at Al.
21 See Ruger et al., supra note 1, at 1209, app. D (reporting that sixty-nine percent of
legal experts stated that "Supreme Court precedent on point" was an "important factor").
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ('The Congress shall have Power.... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes....").
23 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
24 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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focused on what significance, if any, should be attributed to the
fact that the text of the Eleventh Amendment 25 refers to courts of
the United States, a term generally taken to mean federal rather
than state courts. 26 But as a causal matter, that textual
argument appears to have been largely a distraction. If you were
interested in predicting the outcome, you would have done better
to ignore the text of the Constitution and look to the Forecasting
Project model's six factors, only one of which appears to have a
strong positive correlation with what seems to be the central
legal question: the "issue area of the case," here, federalism. 27
And sure enough, by the same 5-4 margin by which it decided
most of its major federalism cases in the period from Justice
Breyer's appointment until Chief Justice Rehnquist's death,28 the
Court in Alden ruled for the state.
Another way of putting that last point is to say that, whether
they realize it or not, the Justices' attitudes towards federalism
play a much larger role in their decision of cases involving
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XI ('The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.").
26 Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 ("[T]he powers delegated to Congress under Article I of the
United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States to
private suits for damages in state courts."); id. at 723-24, 727-30 (rejecting strict textual
analysis; noting that "we have looked to history and experience, and the established order
of things, rather than adhering to the mere letter of the Eleventh Amendment in
determining the scope of the States' constitutional immunity from suit" (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
27 It is possible, however, that other factors do correlate with law. For example,
circuit of origin may matter because some circuits-most notoriously, the Ninth-include
substantial numbers of judges who place less value on narrowly reading precedents than
does the Supreme Court. For October Term 2004, the Supreme Court reversed eighty-four
percent of the Ninth Circuit cases it reviewed, while reversing only seventy-three percent
of the cases from the other circuits combined. Goldstein & Howe, P.C., Circuit Court
Scorecard: October Term 2004 (2005),
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/FinalOTO4CircuitScorecard.pdf; see also
Nine Justices, Ten Years: A Statistical Retrospective, 118 HARV. L. REV. 510, 510-11 &
fig.1 (2004) (noting that from 1994 to 2003, Ninth Circuit accounted for over thirty
percent of all Supreme Court reversals of circuit court decisions). "Circuit of origin" could
thus be implicitly coding for the legal value of precedent.
28 Over the dissents of the other four Justices, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, voted to strike down federal laws as violative
of the Commerce Clause or the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments in Bd. of Trs. of the Univ.
of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78-92 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
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federalism than do any of the particular doctrinal issues those
cases present.
Can we dispatch this result in the same way that I suggested
that we can explain the difficulty of legal scholars in predicting
the swing Justices? Is it a byproduct of the Court's docket? After
all, even when considered from the perspective of a non-swing
Justice, in most cases that reach the Supreme Court there is
typically at least a colorable argument in favor of either side. 29
And conversely, we could surely generate a list of federalism
issues that could conceivably come before the Court, in which the
doctrinal details would be dispositive, regardless of what sort of
scores obtained on the six factors used by the computer model: (1)
Did Congress act within its authority under Article I, Section 8
by creating the Federal Reserve Board? (2) Could Congress expel
Kansas from the Union? (3) Could the California Supreme Court
refuse to be bound by a U.S. Supreme Court decision reversing
the former on an issue of federal law? The key to predicting the
outcomes of these cases is the actual content of constitutional
law.30
These examples confirm that the results of the Supreme Court
Forecasting Project do not support the strongest version of the
legal realist claim that law is indeterminate. Yet legal realists
did not (and do not) typically endorse the radical indeterminacy
thesis. Much of the realist enterprise focused precisely on
contested appellate cases such as those studied in the
Forecasting Project. 31 Likewise, the Forecasting Project's data
set appears directly relevant to the modern debate between
29 See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 409 (1985) ("[T]here are
no easy cases in the Supreme Court. If the case were that easy, certiorari would have
been denied, the appeal would have been dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question, or a clearly erroneous result below would have been overturned summarily."
(footnote omitted)).
30 The answers are: 1) Yes; 2) No; and 3) No. See, respectively, McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 424 (1819) (holding that Congress had authority to
create Bank of the United States); U.S. CONST. art. V ("[N]o State, without its Consent,
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate."); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat) 304, 351 (1816) (holding that Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over
issues of federal law decided in state courts).
31 See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence,
76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 273 & n.31 (1997) ("[T]he Realists... did not generally view the law
as... indeterminate in all cases.... Realists were mainly concerned to point out the
indeterminacy that exists in those cases that are actually litigated, especially those that
make it to the stage of appellate review...." (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism
About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1239 (1931); Max
Radin, In Defense of an Unsystematic Science of Law, 51 YALE L.J. 1269, 1271 (1942))).
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those, like Dworkin, who say that there are correct answers in
hard cases and those, like H.L.A. Hart, who characterize judicial
decision making in such cases as the exercise of discretion. 32
Unless we think that one or more of the six factors for which the
computer coded is meaningfully dependent on law, it is difficult
to resist the conclusion that the experiment is a triumph for
Hartian positivism and all but the most radical versions of legal
realism.
Nonetheless, it is on precisely the aforementioned ground that
I want to resist this conclusion. In my view, even something as
seemingly vague as "this is a case about federalism" should count
as, or is correlated with, a legal reason to rule one way or the
other. I can make my point most effectively by example.
In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether the federal law banning the possession,
obtaining or manufacturing of marijuana could be
constitutionally applied to someone who grew marijuana strictly
within a single state-California-and for medical purposes as
permitted under license from the state. 33 The Court upheld the
federal law by a 6-3 margin.
I am not now especially interested in whether the Raich
decision was correct, so much as I am interested in its political
valence. To the general public, the Raich decision appeared
conservative. A state had liberalized its drug laws, only to
encounter resistance from a conservative federal government,
and the Court had sided with the latter. Yet the majority that
upheld the conservative federal law included all of the Court's
most liberal members, and the dissenters who sided with
California's liberalization included two of its three most
conservative members. 34 Expressing the general public's
bewilderment, Hendrik Hertzberg suggested in the New Yorker
32 Hart concedes to Dworkin that "when particular statutes or precedents prove
indeterminate, or when the explicit law is silent," judges "[v]ery often.., cite some
general principle or some general aim or purpose ... which points towards a determinate
answer for the instant hard case." However, Hart maintains that "though this procedure
certainly defers, it does not eliminate the moment for judicial law-making, since in any
hard case different principles supporting competing analogies may present themselves
and a judge will often have to choose between them, relying, like a conscientious
legislator, on his sense of what is best .. " See Hart, supra note 12, at 274-75.
33 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
34 The majority opinion was written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Thomas dissented.
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magazine that one needed a "Supreme Court Decoder Ring" to
understand how the Raich decision could count as liberal. 35
Of course, legal scholars understand that the decoder ring is
simply federalism. Although Progressives like Louis Brandeis
sang the praises of decentralization, 36 at least since the New
Deal, liberals have generally favored an extremely limited
judicial role in policing the boundaries of federal power.
Conversely, at least for the last thirty years, conservatives have
insisted on preserving some domain of state sovereignty as
essential to the constitutional design.37
What explains the division? As a doctrinal matter, the Justices
appear to disagree about questions of institutional competence.
Those who would uphold national power invoke the "political
safeguards of federalism" that render judicial safeguards largely
unnecessary. 38 Further, they worry about the Court's ability to
draw sensible and workable lines to confine Congressional
power. 39 Meanwhile, the defenders of state sovereignty point to
the central place of federalism-based limits on national power in
35 Hendrik Hertzberg, Watched Pot, THE NEW YORKER, June 27, 2005, at 33.
36 As a Justice, Brandeis most famously made the point in his dissent in New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932), where he praised the experimental
laboratories of the states, but he and other Progressives had been making the point more
broadly in politics as well. See E. E. Steiner, A Progressive Creed: The Experimental
Federalism of Justice Brandeis, 2 YALE L. & POLY REV. 1, 16-22 (1983) (ascribing
Brandeis's conception of federalism to his political relationship with Robert M.
LaFollette).
37 I am dating the relevant period to the Court's decision in National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), although that is just one marker. If one defines
"conservative" as defensive of the status quo, one can identify states' rights with
conservatism as far back as the earliest years of the American republic, when they were
invoked to resist federal efforts to abolish or limit slavery, although during the ante-
Bellum period, abolitionists also sometimes invoked states' rights, particularly in
resisting federal power over fugitive slaves. See Steven Lubet, Slavery on Trial: The Case
of the Oberlin Rescue, 54 ALA. L. REV. 785, 785-87 (2003) ("[Iln a political alignment that
today seems oddly contradictory, the Union itself became the guarantor of slavery while
abolitionists often rallied for the cause of 'States' Rights'.").
38 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 & n.11
(1985) (citing JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
175-84 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543 (1954) [hereinafter Wechsler, Political Safeguards]); see also Larry D. Kramer,
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
215 (2000).
39 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 608 (Souter, J., dissenting) (likening
majority's distinction between commercial and non-commercial activity to discarded
distinction between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce).
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the constitutional design, asserting that states, no less than
individuals, are entitled to judicial protection.40
But it is difficult to take these doctrinal arguments very
seriously, because some of the very Justices who make one set of
arguments in the federalism context make the other set of
arguments in the individual rights context. For example, in
Printz v. United States,41  self-described textualist Justice
Scalia42 begins his discussion of the question whether the
Constitution forbids the federal government from
"commandeering" state and local executive officials by
acknowledging that the text does not speak to the question, but
whereas in other contexts, such as abortion, that would just
about end the matter for him,43 he then goes on to find an anti-
commandeering principle in the Constitution's interstices. 44
Conversely, in their criticism of the Court's decisions protecting
state sovereignty, Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer have
used the very constitutional insults--"judicial activism,"
"penumbras," and "Lochner"-that they have blithely ignored
when hurled at individual rights decisions which they accept. 45
40 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[Tihe federal
balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in
securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of
Government has tipped the scales too far."); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 564-67 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (asserting necessity of judicial review for federalism issues because "[t]he
States' role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional law, not of
legislative grace"); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1690-91 (2004) ("If the courts are to function as interpreters of
constitutional rights, they must necessarily function as arbiters of constitutional
structure.").
41 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
42 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, Common.Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (offering views on textualism).
43 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Constitution
does not protect abortion rights because "(1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing
about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it to be
legally proscribed").
44 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) ("Because there is no
constitutional text speaking to this precise question, the answer to the [petitioners']
challenge must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the
Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court."); id. at 933 (finding categorical
prohibition on commandeering of executive officials).
45 See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 98-99 (2000) (Stevens, J., joined
by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part) ("judicial
activism"); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 665 (1999) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
("penumbras"); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("Lochner"); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
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By my reckoning, in the recent period, only Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy have been consistent in the arguments they use in
the individual rights and states' rights contexts, and even for
them, one suspects that the consistency is not so much a product
of respect for what Herbert Wechsler famously called "neutral
principles," 46 as a reflection of the fact that they happen to
support both relatively robust individual rights and relatively
robust states' rights.47
The opportunistic use of arguments in federalism (and other
kinds of) cases may appear to reinforce the notion that general
attitudes about federalism (and other broad issues), rather than
law, account for the outcomes in the Supreme Court. But this is
a false dichotomy, because-within the range of plausible
outcomes in contested cases-general attitudes about federalism
are distinctly legal in an important sense: For Supreme Court
Justices, attitudes about federalism can and sometimes do trump
attitudes about what would be wise policy in a way that is much
less common for politicians.
Contrast, for example, the votes of most of the Justices in
Raich with the action of Congress and the President less than
three months earlier in passing a law that-in violation of
principles of finality and respect for state legislative and judicial
processes that political conservatives had been espousing for
decades-authorized a federal district court to rehear, without
any deference, issues that had been fully adjudicated by the state
courts regarding the tragic fate of one individual named in the
Act, Theresa Marie Schiavo.48 The legislation was roundly and
appropriately condemned as a betrayal of state sovereignty. 49
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 701-02 (1999) (Breyer, J., joined by
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) ("Lochner").
46 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 19-20 (1959) [hereinafter Wechsler, Neutral Principles) (defining neutral
principles).
47 Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 575 (2003) (suggesting that for Justices with
conservative agendas in the mid-1990s, "the prospect for doctrinal innovation in
federalism cases was much brighter. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy had proven to be
much more consistently supportive of states' rights than of rolling back individual rights
in areas involving social issues").
48 The legislation-Act of Mar. 21, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15-was applied
in a series of court decisions. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d
1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam), reh'g en banc denied 403 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2005); Schiavo ex rel.
Schindler v. Schiavo, 125 S. Ct. 1692 (2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F.
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To be sure, one can find instances of the Justices voting in
ways that appear to betray their federalism credentials, even on
end-of-life questions of the sort that gave rise to the Schiavo
legislation. This year, for example, three otherwise states'-
rights-friendly Justices-Chief Justice Roberts50 and Justices
Scalia and Thomas-dissented from the Court's decision in
Gonzales v. Oregon, which invalidated on statutory grounds the
Attorney General's effort to use the federal Controlled
Substances Act5l to displace a state law that authorizes
physicians to dispense lethal doses of medication to terminally ill
patients. 52 Whether their votes were in fact inconsistent with
their commitment to states' rights depends on what one thinks of
the merits of the federal government's argument, of course, and
Justice Thomas argued in dissent that it was the majority that
was acting inconsistently in departing from what he took to be
the core principles of Raich.53 But whoever had the better of that
argument, I concede that Justices do sometimes permit their
views of the underlying substantive dispute to color their
conclusions about the proper allocation of decisional authority. If
Gonzales v. Oregon is not an example, then certainly Bush v.
Gore54 or some other case is.
Even with this concession, however, it nonetheless remains
true that Justices often or at least more than occasionally seem to
Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam), reh'g denied 404 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2005), reh'g en banc denied,
404 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 125 S. Ct. 1722
(2005).
49 See, e.g., Charles Fried, Op-Ed., Federalism Has a Right to Life, Too, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2005, at A17 ("[R]epublicans in Congress and President Bush have, in a few brief
legislative clauses, embraced the kind of free-floating judicial activism, disregard for
orderly procedure and contempt for the integrity of state processes that they quite rightly
have denounced and sought to discipline for decades.").
50 The evidence that Chief Justice Roberts is otherwise friendly to states' rights can
be found in his opinion as a Circuit Judge regarding denial of rehearing en banc in the
"hapless toad" case, see Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), and in his willingness to join in
the dissent from the Court's conclusion that congressional power to adopt bankruptcy law
authorizes abrogation of state sovereign immunity in Central Virginia Community
College v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1005 (2006) (Thomas, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and
Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
51 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000).
52 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
53 Id. at 939-40 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The majority's newfound understanding of
the [Controlled Substances Act] as a statute of limited reach is all the more puzzling
because it rests upon constitutional principles that the majority of the Court rejected in
Raich.")
54 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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care about federalism as such, rather than only invoking
federalism opportunistically.
Consider the findings of Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, who
studied Supreme Court voting patterns in federalism cases from
1985-1997.55 Individual Justices' political attitudes certainly
made a big difference. Conservative Justices were roughly one
and a half times more likely to use states' rights to defeat a
liberal plaintiffs claims than a conservative plaintiffs claims,
and roughly twice as likely to use states' rights to support a
conservative plaintiffs claim than a liberal plaintiffs claim.5 6
Conversely, liberal Justices were more than twice as likely to use
states' rights to defeat a conservative plaintiffs claim than to
defeat a liberal plaintiffs claim, and almost twice as likely to use
states' rights to support a liberal plaintiffs position than to
support a conservative plaintiffs position. 57
These results may overstate ideological impact, however,
because Cross and Tiller apparently coded votes for federal
preemption as votes against states' rights.58 Yet, as a recent
empirical study by Michael Greve and Jonathan Klick illustrates,
Justices who otherwise generally favor states' rights also
generally tend to favor preemption, and Justices who otherwise
generally oppose states' rights generally tend to oppose
preemption. 59 By respectively coding liberal Justices' votes
against preemption, and conservative Justices' votes for
preemption, as both running against federalism type, the Cross
and Tiller data understate the importance of the Justices'
dispositions towards federalism-unless, that is, their general
attitudes towards preemption are themselves strongly correlated
with the ideological valence of the outcomes in those cases.
In any event, even if we do not quibble with how Cross and
Tiller coded preemption cases, the results point in at least two
directions. As I have acknowledged, they pretty strongly indicate
55 Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An Empirical
Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741 (2000).
56 Id. at 760 & tbl.2.
57 Id. at 761 & tbl.3.
58 See id. at 753-54.
59 See Michael Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Empirical Assessment 4, 54-57 (Fla. State. Univ. Coll. of Law Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 136, 2004), available at http://ssrn.comabstract=634263
("We find substantial evidence to buttress the impression of preemption cases as a mirror
image of pure federalism cases.").
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that the specific outcome-liberal or conservative-makes a big
difference. But they also indicate that views about federalism
qua federalism make a big difference too. For example, in nearly
half (46.7%) of the salient cases in which a plaintiff sought a
politically conservative result through national power, the
conservative Justices stuck with their states' rights bona fides
and rejected the claim.60 And more generally, the correlation of
outcome with individual Justices' overall liberal/conservative
ideology is substantially less than one. Views about federalism
as such are clearly making a difference for the Justices in
substantial numbers of cases. Can the same be said about more
than a handful of Senators or members of the House?
Ur-attitudinalists Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth once wrote
that "Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely
conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he is
extremely liberal."61 There is more than a grain of truth in this
observation, but it is also misleading insofar as it suggests that
there is no difference between being a liberal or conservative
judge versus being a liberal or conservative politician. At a
minimum, most judges seem to care about federalism (one way or
the other) in a way that most politicians do not.
Still, to say that Supreme Court Justices care more about
federalism than politicians do is not necessarily to say that
Supreme Court Justices care about law. The category of law,
after all, cannot sensibly be defined to encompass "everything
that isn't politics." And there is considerable evidence that
Justices distort their methodological commitments in federalism
cases to reach results that coincide with their federalism
preferences. 62 Perhaps attitudes about federalism are just
60 Cross & Tiller, supra note 55, at 758, 760 tbl.2.
61 JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65 (1993); see also LEE EPSTEIN AND JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND
CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 3 (2005) ("[W]ith scattered
exceptions here and there, the decisions of Supreme Court justices, tend to reflect their
own political values.").
62 See Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court's
Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 257-58 (2004) (tables showing how the
Justices selectively cite evidence from the Founding that supports their views about the
allocation of authority between the state and national governments); see also Peter J.
Smith, The Marshall Court and the Originalist's Dilemma, 90 MINN. L. REV. 612 (2006)
(arguing that the Justices favoring robust state sovereignty discount the nationalist
opinions of the Marshall Court). The evidence is not entirely uni-directional, however. For
example in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005), by a 5-4
margin, a broad reading of the scope of federal court jurisdiction in diversity cases under
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another kind of attitude. A Justice might directly value
federalism (or not) in the same way that a Justice might directly
value the right of privacy or due process.
Yet describing attitudes towards federalism as first-order
preferences of this sort does not ring true. It may be pointless to
look behind other kinds of preferences: Why do I prefer chocolate
to vanilla ice cream? I don't know. I just do. But attitudes about
so complex a subject as federalism are unlikely to be first-order
preferences. (Attitudes about privacy, due process, and other
values treated by attitudinalists as simply political preferences
are also unlikely to be simple first-order preferences, but let us
put that issue aside.) In particular, two sorts of mechanisms
probably generate judicial attitudes towards federalism, and both
are tied up in legal questions.
First, one might form attitudes about federalism by a top-down
methodology. Perhaps one thinks on textual or historical
grounds that the Constitution is (or is not) a compact among
sovereign states,63 and that any construction of the document
must begin by recognizing (or disavowing) the states' sovereign
status. Or, deriving a core principle of democracy from the
Constitution's text and history, one might think (or be skeptical
about claims) that preserving a substantial domain of state and
local rule maximizes voters' abilities to match their preferences
to the policies under which they live, both by voting at the polls
and by voting with their feet.64 Or again, one might (or might
the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Interestingly, the majority
included all but one of the Justices who typically vote to constrain federal power, and the
dissent included all but one of the justices who usually vote to sustain federal power. This
seeming reversal is probably best explained by the fact that each of the Justices was
driven more by his or her attitude towards the proper relative role of text and purpose in
statutory interpretation than by views about federalism.
63 Compare, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803 (1995) ("[T]he
Framers envisioned a uniform national system, rejecting the notion that the Nation was a
collection of States, and instead creating a direct link between the National Government
and the people of the United States."), and id. at 839 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("A
distinctive character of the National Government, the mark of its legitimacy, is that it
owes its existence to the act of the whole people who created it."), with id. at 846-50
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ('The ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the
consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated
people of the Nation as a whole.").
64 See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 418 (1956) ('The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community
which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods. .... The greater the number of
communities and the greater the variance among them, the closer the consumer will come
to fully realizing his preference position."). Then-Professor (now-Judge) McConnell
provides a nice formulation of this point:
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not) find the command of a domain of reserved powers for the
states so unambiguous in the structure of Article I and the Tenth
Amendment 65 that for the judiciary to fail to enforce that
command would amount to dereliction of duty.66 It should be
plain that such arguments are legal insofar as they begin with
the Constitution, its history, and its purposes.
Second, one might form attitudes about federalism from the
bottom up-that is, by asking what sort of policy outcomes will be
fostered by judicial solicitude to concerns about federalism. For
example, a liberal Justice looking back over the nation's history
might reasonably conclude that principles of state sovereignty
have, more often than not, been used to check national efforts to
redress racial and other forms of inequality, or that they have too
often stood in the way of federal laws that were, on balance,
desirable. If so, the liberal Justice might thus also conclude that
she ought not to afford protection to state sovereignty.
Or the liberal Justice might think that the past provides
unreliable guidance for the medium-term future, in which
federalism conflicts will most often pit a liberal state policy-
such as California's legalization of medical marijuana or Oregon's
legalization of physician-assisted suicide-against a more
conservative federal policy. If so, our liberal Justice might
conclude that she indeed ought to provide some protection for
state sovereignty.
[A]ssume that there are only two states, with equal populations of 100 each. Assume
further that 70 percent of State A, and only 40 percent of State B, wish to outlaw
smoking in public buildings. The others are opposed. If the decision is made on a
national basis by a majority rule, 110 people will be pleased, and 90 displeased. If a
separate decision is made by majorities in each state, 130 will be pleased, and only 70
displeased. The level of satisfaction will be still greater if some smokers in State A
decide to move to State B, and some anti-smokers in State B decide to move to State
A. In the absence of economies of scale in government services, significant
externalities, or compelling arguments from justice, this is a powerful reason to
prefer decentralized government. States are preferable governing units to the federal
government, and local government to states.
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484, 1494, 1494 (1987) (book review).
65 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.").
66 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (refusing to uphold
federal legislation forbidding firearm possession in school zones because "[t]o do so would
require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose
something not enumerated ... and that there never will be a distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local .... This we are unwilling to do." (citations
omitted)).
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Or perhaps the liberal Justice thinks something like the
following: robust protection for state sovereignty will entitle
states like California to liberalize their drug laws even in the face
of a conservative congressional commitment to the war on drugs,
which would be desirable, but it would also mean that laws like
the Endangered Species Act67 could be struck down, which would
be very undesirable. Thus, I'll hold my nose and vote to sustain
federal power in a case like Raich because that will preserve
federal power in cases where its absence would cause even more
serious problems.
In each of these examples, conversely, we can imagine a
conservative Justice reaching different conclusions based on her
contrary assessment of the desirability of the policies invalidated
or validated under a view that is either committed or opposed to
judicial protection of state sovereignty. The approach in these
examples is "bottom-up" in the sense that-within the range of
views that could plausibly be reconciled with the constitutional
text and structure-one chooses a top-level approach to
federalism cases based on the concrete bottom-level results to
which it will likely lead.
Is such a bottom-up approach consistent with treating
federalism as a legal question? It might not seem so. After all,
my hypothetical bottom-up Justice begins with results and then
moves to a view of law from there. And "result-oriented" judging
is commonly contrasted to judgment according to law.68
Yet bottom-up-ness of the sort I have just described is not
result-oriented in the sense in which result-oriented judging is
typically criticized. A true result-oriented judge asks on a case-
by-case basis what outcome is best, and then constructs a legal
argument to justify that outcome, perfectly content to reject that
very argument in the next case because it leads to a result she
dislikes. My bottom-up federalist (or anti-federalist) adopts an
67 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
68 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 535, 539 (1999) (anticipating criticism from suggestion that "theories should be
judged by their likely fruits" because "[t]o some, the suggestion that a constitutional
theory should be selected based on its likely results may seem to invite unprincipled,
result-oriented decision making that is inconsistent with obligations of constitutional
fidelity and the rule of law"); Erwin N. Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term-
Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81,
91-94 (1960) ("When decisions are too much result-oriented, the law and the public are
not well served.").
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approach to a category of cases based on an assessment of the
pattern of results that will follow from that approach over time.
Crucially, she then follows that approach even though it means
casting some votes in favor of results she dislikes.
To be sure, the willingness to make decisions according to high-
level principle is not unique to judges. Members of Congress, for
example, might value high-level principles like checks and
balances or, more realistically, the prerogatives of Congress vis-
a-vis the President, in denying the President a power they think
it would be beneficial for him to have. Likewise, an
Administration committed to preserving the prerogatives of the
Presidency might invoke executive privilege to resist turning
over essentially harmless information to Congress, and thus pay
at least a short-term political price.
But if elected officials sometimes support or oppose policies
because of a high-level principle rather than the policies'
immediate consequences, this mode of operation is, or at least is
supposed to be, characteristic of courts. Although Wechsler's
terminology has not worn well, he was undoubtedly tapping into
the orthodox ideology of the American judiciary when he insisted
that to be legitimate, a court's ruling must "rest[] on ... reasons
that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any
immediate result that is involved."69
A principle that says "courts ought not second-guess Congress
as to the outer bounds of its power" surely qualifies as a neutral
principle in Wechsler's sense. Indeed, it is a principle Wechsler
himself more or less endorsed.70 But it is equally a neutral
principle to insist, as the Supreme Court did in United States v.
Lopez71 and United States v. Morrison,72 that the strategy of
enumerated powers of Article I, Section 8, requires that some
regulatory domain be beyond the reach of Congress. That this is
and was a matter of principle for the Raich dissenters-Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Thomas-is
69 Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 46, at 19.
70 See id. at 23-24 (ouestioning whether "there are any neutral principles that might
have been employed to mark the limits of the commerce power of the Congress in terms
more circumscribed than the virtual abandonment of limits in the principle that has
prevailed!' in the Court's decisions as of 1959): Herbert Wechsler, Political Safeauards,
supra note 38 (arguing that structure of federal government provides principal
constitutional protection for state sovereignty).
71 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
72 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
2007]
ST JOHN'S JO URAAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
difficult to contest, unless one thinks that each of these
conservatives thought it wise on policy grounds to exempt
California-grown and consumed medical marijuana from federal
regulation. 73
III. CHOOSING LEGAL PRINCIPLES BASED ON THE RESULTS THEY
ENTAIL
It still might be objected that judges are not really acting in a
principled manner unless they are principled in the identification
of their principles, rather than only in the application of their
principles. In this view, a liberal Justice who votes to uphold a
draconian federal drug law because that is the price of ensuring
that the Endangered Species Act survives, is still simply acting
on an attitude; it's just a sophisticated attitude that accepts the
institutional constraints of being on the Supreme Court. If the
Justice could get away with upholding just those laws she liked
and striking down just those laws she disliked, she would. She
only accepts the limits imposed by her principles regarding
federalism (or any other doctrine) as the closest she can come to
achieving her full preferences in an institutional setting in which
judges are supposed to provide reasons for their judgments that
are not obviously inconsistent from one case to the next.
The foregoing objection, however, concedes the main issue to
those of us who say that law makes a difference. The crucial
question is why Justices feel that they can't get away with
espousing contradictory principles from one case to the next. The
policy reversals by long-serving Senators on the question
whether it is appropriate to filibuster judicial nominees shows
that they scarcely feel bound by their prior statements, once a
different party captures the Presidency. 74 Judges and Justices,
73 As the Raich majority noted, under the view proposed by Justice Thomas, even
marijuana cultivated and consumed intra-state for recreational purposes would be exempt
from federal legislation, see Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2213 n.38 (2005), a result
that it can hardly be assumed Justice Thomas favors on policy grounds.
74 For example, Republican Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, who led the charge
against the Democrats' filibustering in 2005, voted against cloture during the filibuster of
Richard Paez, a Clinton nominee to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Dana
Milbank, The Killer Instinct, WASH. POST, May 19, 2005, at A14. In 1995, some current
Democratic Senators, including Barbara Boxer, Joseph Lieberman, Russ Feingold,
Edward Kennedy, and John Kerry, supported a proposed rule change more extensive then
the one suggested by Republicans in 2005. Not limited to judicial nominees, the 1995 rule
change would have effectively ended the filibuster. See 141 Cong. Rec. S430 (1995); Craig
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by contrast, usually feel at least some obligation to explain their
apparent contradictions, and as a case like Raich demonstrates,
they sometimes act in ways that strongly suggest that they really
do consider themselves bound by the principles they have
previously espoused.
The hard-core attitudinalist can explain Justices' willingness
to be bound by principles they accept, even if they lead to results
they dislike, only at the cost of reducing attititudinalism to a
harmless truism: To define "attitudes" to include high-order
principles like a commitment to a residuum of state sovereignty
or deference to Congress, is to make clear that attitudes are not
opposed to law. The move is not unlike certain skeptics' efforts to
deny the existence of altruism by asserting that altruists are
motivated by the pleasure they derive from helping others. That
may be, but this leaves the question of why they derive pleasure
from helping others, and if the skeptic can say only that
preferences are exogenous, then he has offered no argument
against the existence of altruism; he has simply clouded the
issue. Likewise, if a commitment to act on legal principle is
simply another attitude, then attitudinalism poses no threat to
accounts of judging that take law seriously.
There remains, however, a related objection. Working within
the ideology of law, one might still think that judges and Justices
ought to derive their principles in a top-down rather than a
bottom-up fashion. In this view, the liberal Justice who accepts
the constitutionality of strict federal drug laws as the price of
saving the Endangered Species Act has misunderstood his job.
That job involves locating principles in text, structure, history,
precedent, and other sources of constitutional meaning, and then
applying those principles to concrete particulars. It may not be
result-oriented in the conventional sense for a Justice to form
high-order principles based on projected concrete results, so long
as she then follows the high-order principles, but this method of
selecting principles for decision nonetheless lacks legitimacy.
Principles must come from the conventional sources of
constitutional meaning, this objection asserts. 75
Gilbert, GOP Says Democrats Have Flip-Flopped on Filibuster; Feingold Voted to Curb it
10 Years Ago; Now He Says it's Essential, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 24, 2005, at Al.
75 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 54-55 (1980) (finding neutral-
principle approach insufficient, by itself, to serve as guiding theory for discovering and
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Were Justices' attitudes towards particular projected results
all that went into their formulation of principles, this last
objection would have bite. Constitutional text, structure, history,
and so forth constrain the legitimate scope of principles that a
Justice can adopt. But within the fairly large zone of ambiguity,
it is not only legitimate, but essential that Justices take account
of the likely results to which competing principles would likely
lead.7 6
The point is clearest in debates over constitutional theory:
Scholars espousing one interpretive approach or another go to
great lengths to show that their preferred methodology yields the
canonical answers and rejects the answers now deemed clear
mistakes: A good theory must yield Brown v. Board,77 Griswold
v. Connecticut78 (though not necessarily Roe v. Wade79), and
Baker v. Carr;8O it must disapprove Dred Scott v. Sandford,81
Plessy v. Ferguson,82 and Lochner v. New York.83
enforcing fundamental constitutional values) [hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST]; John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 949 (1973) ("A neutral and durable principle may be a thing of beauty and
a joy forever. But if it lacks connection with any value the Constitution marks as special,
it is not a constitutional principle and the Court has no business imposing it.").
76 In describing judicial approaches toward federalism cases, Judge Newman has
articulated this very concept. Judge Newman explained:
[A] judge functioning in a federal system is inevitably influenced by values associated
with his or her view of federalism .... I do not mean that each judge is free to
construct and apply a wholly personal view of federalism. The federalism slate is no
more pristine than any other on which the judge writes. The origin of the states, the
formation of the Union, the adoption of the Constitution, the Civil War, the
Reconstruction Amendments, the realities of national power in post-New Deal
America - in short, all of our history and all of our practice limit the range within
which a judge is entitled to have views about federalism. But some range exists....
Federalism, in its many applications, presents choices .... Judges considering
[diverse] issues will be influenced to some extent by the values they associate with
federalism.
See Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of
Institutional Values, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 200, 210-11 (1984).
77 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
79 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
80 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
81 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
82 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
83 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a similar conception of the "constitutional catechism" that
"a Supreme Court nominee must recite.., if he or she is to be confirmed," see Professor
Balkin's blog at Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/01/constitutional-
catechism.html (Jan. 11, 2006, 18:11). Professor Balkin observes that
The nominee must state that he or she (1) believes that there is a right to privacy, (2)
that Griswold correctly protected this right of privacy at least as to the right of
married persons to purchase and use contraceptives; (3) that Eisenstadt [v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972)]-which extends Griswold to single persons-is correctly decided
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Furthermore, we need not ascend to the level of grand
constitutional theory to see that any relatively abstract
constitutional principle must be constructed in substantial part
to match the outcomes deemed essential by the legal community
at large. Here is how Justice Kennedy, speaking for himself and
Justice O'Connor, put that point in his Lopez concurrence: "[T]he
Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole have an
immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause
jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point."84
But does this sort of assurance really answer the objection in
its most general form? Recall that the bottom-up approach to
principle formation aims to generate principles that in turn yield
concrete results that the particular Justice adopting the
principles favors on grounds of policy, values, or attitudes. Those
results may be consistent with the legal status quo at any given
moment, but they need not be. Suppose the Justice thinks the
Court's extant federalism jurisprudence (or some other body of
law) yields highly undesirable results. Such a Justice could well
favor principles that produce results inconsistent with the
constitutional canon at any given time. If so, she would be acting
according to legal principles, but we could not defend her method
of principle selection on the ground that it is highly constrained
by the consensus views of the legal community.
This form of the objection, I acknowledge, has bite in theory. A
Justice committed to overturning whole domains of constitutional
law simply because he disfavors the results that the prevailing
legal principles tend to produce, could not be said to be picking
legal principles in a manner that is constrained by law.
But this is a theoretical worry only. The confirmation process
we now have is very poorly suited for discerning potential
Justices' views about genuinely controversial issues that have
been or are likely soon to come before the Court. What it is well
suited to discover-indeed, perhaps the only thing it is well
suited to discover-is whether a nominee accepts as settled the
principles around which a strong consensus exists. We hear
as to its result; (4) that Brown v. Board of Education was correctly decided, (5) that
Plessy v. Ferguson was incorrectly decided, and (6) that the one person one vote
principle in Reynolds v. Sims[, 377 U.S. 533 (1964),] is correct.
Id.
84 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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nominees uniformly praising or accepting as settled those
decisions widely regarded as canonical, while invoking anti-
canonical cases as illustrations of the proposition that sometimes
the Court must overrule its own precedents. Anyone who makes
it through this process without perjuring himself or herself is
extremely unlikely to start dismantling the constitutional
canon.
85
Perhaps a different way to make that last point is to
acknowledge that except in periods of unusually sudden legal
change, the unseen areas of agreement among the Justices dwarf
the highly visible areas of disagreement.8 6 If so, it may not
matter very much how a Justice chooses the legal meta-
principles that will guide him or her in cases in which a variety
of plausible answers can be given. The Hartian positivist would
say that decisions in such cases are discretionary.8 7 The strong
attitudinalist would say they are ideological.88  A weaker
attitudinalist would say that individual Justices are
substantially driven by what would generally be regarded as non-
legal factors, including strategic factors that take account of the
behavior of their colleagues.8 9 I have argued here that these
decisions are also (although not entirely) driven by legal
principles, and that these principles can be called "legal" even if
derived by a calculus that looks to their long-term impact.
85 At least with respect to federalism, Justice Thomas is an arguable exception to this
claim, for he has indicated a willingness to roll back federal power by distinguishing, as in
the pre-New Deal period, between commerce and manufacture. See id. at 586-87.
However, Justice Thomas is not an exception to the general proposition I am advancing in
this Essay, for Justice Thomas has pretty clearly formed his views of the appropriate line
between state and federal authority in a top-down manner. He begins with a view about
the structure of Article I and the original understanding, and derives a relatively narrow
understanding of the scope of the Commerce Clause from there.
86 Consider the voting patterns of the Court from 1994 to 2003. Of the 823 decisions
analyzed in one study, the Court split 5-4 only 175 times (21.3%). See Nine Justices, Ten
Years: A Statistical Retrospective, supra note 27, at 520 tbl.4. By contrast, the Court
decided 356 of those cases (43.3%) without any dissent. Id.
87 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
88 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
89 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN AND JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE xiii (1998)
("[J]ustices are strategic actors who realize that their ability to achieve their [policy] goals
depends on a consideration of the preferences of others, of the choices they expect others
to make, and of the institutional context in which they act.").
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CONCLUSION
I would conclude with a few words about what I mean by "long-
term" impact. Consider the saga of Justice Felix Frankfurter. As
a progressive lawyer and law professor in the first third of the
twentieth century, Frankfurter came to see activist judicial
review as tending towards politically conservative results. We
don't know for certain how Frankfurter came by his
jurisprudential views, but it is not unreasonable to assume that
the deference he tended to grant to Congress and state
legislatures was rooted in substantial part in an extrapolation
from his formative period. Having concluded that activist
judicial review would do progressive causes more harm than
good, he stuck by that view even during the 1950s and 1960s,
when activist judicial review tended to further progressive
causes.
From a certain perspective, Frankfurter is a tragic figure:
having erected his Maginot Line of judicial restraint, he lacked
the flexibility to adjust to the new social reality and ended up not
merely fighting the last war, but enlisting in the army of the
enemy.90 But we may offer at least two defenses of Frankfurter's
rigidity. First, perhaps long-term policy calculations played an
insubstantial role in his actual choice of principles. Perhaps he
followed Thayer, Holmes and other champions of judicial
restraint for top-down reasons having to do with the proper role
of courts and elected bodies, apart from the likely outputs of
those bodies.
Second, maybe Frankfurter was right. The relatively recent
resurgence of criticism of conservative judicial activism-
especially but not exclusively in cases involving federalism--calls
to mind Zhou En-Lai's answer to a question about the effect of
the French Revolution: "Too soon to tell."91 Whether judicial
restraint or strong judicial protection for state sovereignty or any
other jurisprudential principle serves conservative or progressive
values in the long run can only be answered in, well, the long
90 Perhaps most salient in this regard are Frankfurter's dissents in West Virginia
Board State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-52 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-70, 280-97 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
91 See SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION xiii
(1989).
2007]
ST JOHN'S JO URAAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
run. Justice Frankfurter's critique of judicial review of politics in
Baker v. Carr was derided by liberals for nearly forty years.
Then the Supreme Court decided Bush v. Gore,92 and
Frankfurter didn't look so bad.
The hard question for a Justice who is inclined to select
abstract jurisprudential principles based in part on his or her
assessment of the likely long-term consequences of those
principles, is what counts as an appropriate temporal window.
At the very least, principles must be binding from case to case. A
judge or Justice who switches his or her principles from one case
to the next-one day adopting robust protection for state
sovereignty because it protects a state's power to take a measure
he approves on policy grounds and another day denying any such
protection because he disapproves of the relevant state policy-is
not acting according to principle in any meaningful sense.
But it does not follow that the relevant time horizon must be
effectively infinite or even the expected tenure of a Justice. It is
perfectly appropriate, and in keeping with the common-law
conception of judging, for a Justice to adjust his or her legal
principles in response to new cases. A New Dealer might at first
suppose that the lesson of 1937 was that Courts should defer to
elected officials, full stop, only to encounter cases in which the
arguments against deference in certain contexts-such as racial
discrimination, 93  malapportionment, 94  and freedom of
expression 95-seem compelling. If the Justice then adopts a
principle (such as John Ely's principle of representation
reinforcement 96) that explains why deference is inappropriate in
these new settings, he does not act in an unprincipled fashion.
But even at this level, too-frequent switching of principles belies
the claim that the principles are really being followed. More
than one or at most two fundamental shifts over the course of a
judicial career should be prima facie evidence of unprincipled,
and thus, non-legal decision making.
There still remains the embarrassment that as an aggregate
body the Court can appear unprincipled even when its individual
92 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
93 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
94 Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
95 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624.
96 See generally ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 75.
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members act in individually principled ways. Federalism cases
provide a particularly acute example. In 1995, Lopez
reinvigorated a notion of areas of traditional state sovereignty
that, in a somewhat different doctrinal context, had been
squarely rejected in 1985 by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth.,97 which overruled the 1978 decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery,98 which in turn overruled the 1968
decision Maryland v. Wirtz.99 By my count, only one of the
Justices to have participated in these cases--Justice Blackmun-
ever changed his mind about the basic issue;100 yet because of
changes in personnel, the Court as a whole blew in the wind.
And yet through it all, the basic judicial conception of the
Constitution's allocation of authority between the state and
national governments did not much vary. Even under National
League of Cities or the view of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor in Raich, the federal government has enormous
power. The room for maneuver of the Justices' differing views
about federalism (and most other subjects) is constrained by the
giant mass of legal doctrine that does not get litigated. Looking
forward, further empirical work on the Court (by attitudinalists
or others) could profitably focus less on the tip of cases that
divide the Justices, and more on what determines the shape of
the iceberg of agreement beneath the surface.
97 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
98 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
99 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
100 Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., writing for the majority) (overruling National League of Cities), with
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Blackmun, J., joining in the
majority opinion).
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